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Abstract. We present an embedding of the stable failures model of CSP
in the PVS theorem prover. Our work, extending a previous embedding of
the traces model of CSP in [6], provides a platform for the formal verifica-
tion not only of safety specifications, but also of liveness specifications of
concurrent systems in theorem provers. Such a platform is particularly
good at analyzing infinite-state systems with an arbitrary number of
components. We demonstrate the power of this embedding by using it to
construct formal proofs that the asymmetric dining philosophers problem
with an arbitrary number of philosophers is deterministic and deadlock-
free, and that an industrial-scale example, a ‘virtual network’ [22], with
any number of dimensions, is deadlock-free. We have established some
generic proof tactics for verification of properties of networks with many
components. In addition, our technique of integrating FDR and PVS in
our demonstration allows for handling of systems that would be difficult
or impossible to analyze using either tool on its own.
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1 Introduction
Concurrent systems are often complex because they consist of many compon-
ents that can run independently and simultaneously. Proving properties of these
systems is also often a difficult task. CSP provides a rich notation for modelling
these kinds of system, and the many laws of CSP can be used to verify specific-
ations of such systems, thus enabling designers to check whether the systems
meet desired properties or not. However, constructing proofs of correctness by
hand is arduous and error-prone.
One highly successful solution to this problem is FDR [9], which is a powerful
model-checking tool providing automated analysis and verification of CSP pro-
cess descriptions. In conjunction with many advanced techniques including data
independence [11] and hierarchical compression [15], FDR can in many cases deal
efficiently with processes with vast or even infinite state spaces. However, most
classes of infinite-state processes are out of reach of model-checking with cur-
rent techniques. Data independence allows model-checking of systems that have
an infinite state space on account of an infinite datatype, but not of systems
with an arbitrary number of concurrent processes. The alternative is to take a
theorem-proving approach, which allows us to reason about arbitrary processes.
PVS [4, 5], the Prototype Verification System, is an interactive theorem prover
based on a form of higher-order logic. It provides an environment for constructing
precise specifications, and for efficient mechanized verification. Although it is
similar in many ways to other theorem provers such as Isabelle/HOL [13] and
IMPS [8], it supports a richer type system, and checks semantic consistency for a
PVS specification. PVS is also a natural choice for this work because of previous
work in [6, 19, 7] where the authors represent the denotational semantics of the
traces model of CSP in PVS and then apply their proof strategy to model and
verify various safety properties of security protocols. Since the stable failures
model records both traces and failures information, we choose to take Dutertre
and Schneider’s PVS traces embedding and augment it with stable failures.
The extension from Dutertre and Schneider’s encoding of the traces model
to our embedding of the stable failures model is not at all trivial. They do not
consider various important operators of CSP, such as successful termination and
sequential composition; our embedding, however, does include these operators,
along with various laws about their behaviour. In addition, in order to verify
deadlock freedom and determinism, we have formally proved many crucial rules,
including the unique fixed point theorem, deterministic induction and various
deadlock rules. These rules have previously been proved only by hand; we here
give rigorous machine-verified proofs.
Dutertre and Schneider’s embedding could prove only safety properties; our
platform can verify liveness properties (for example, deadlock freedom and de-
terminism), which cannot be analyzed in the traces model. We will show in
this paper how to prove determinism and deadlock freedom of the asymmetric
dining philosophers network with an arbitrary number of philosophers, using
mathematical induction. In the case of deadlock freedom, the work in PVS es-
sentially reduces the problem to a very small model-checking verification exercise
involving under 100 states. Although the proof could be completed entirely in
PVS, it would be extremely tedious and time-consuming to perform this model-
checking manually in a theorem prover; the more natural approach, and the one
adopted here, is to use FDR to complete the finite-state model-checking part
of the verification. The main idea of the proof comes from [15], which uses a
hierarchical compression technique in FDR to prove the case with very large
numbers of philosophers.
Moreover, we have formally proved some of the deadlock rules described
in [14], which can be used to construct deadlock-free networks. These formal
proofs provide rigorous verification of the rules. The significance of these rules
is that FDR can then verify deadlock freedom of complex networks by analysis
of individual components of the network. Here we show how to construct the
formal proof of these rules, and then use the rules to prove deadlock freedom of
a case study in PVS.
In contrast to model-checking, embedding the semantics of CSP into higher-
order logics provides mechanical support for verifying the correctness of prop-
erties in a system. In the early stage, Camilleri [2] has shown how a theorem
prover based on higher-order logic can provide a natural framework for mech-
anizing CSP. However, his mechanization was slightly restricted since both the
semantics of CSP and theorem-proving tools have been improved over the past
decade.
Tej and Wolff [20] provide a basic platform of encoding the denotational
semantics of the CSP failures/divergences model in Isabelle/HOL, along with
verifying the consistency of theories and a number of algebraic laws. Our experi-
ence suggests, however, that simply providing an embedding is far from sufficient
to allow one to verify properties of systems in practice. We therefore have built
up a large number of theorems and lemmas to support the verification of partic-
ular properties of practical systems. Isobe and Roggenbach [10] propose a new
tool called CSP-Prover which provides an encoding of the CSP stable failures
model. It appears that this encoding, based on the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL,
is essentially an extension of Tej and Wolff’s work; their formalization supports
the theory of complete metric spaces as well as the theory of complete partial
orders, allowing it to deal with a much wider class of properties of recursion. We
have taken a similar approach in our model; furthermore, we have established a
class of generic proof tactics, and shown how to combine the use of FDR and
a theorem prover so that we are able to model and verify properties of many
different types of system.
Brooke [1] uses Timed CSP and PVS and FDR to construct tool-supported
proofs to verify properties of systems on an industrial scale. Another successful
case is the programming language Circus [3, 16], which combines CSP and Z to
specify, validate and develop real-time programs. All Circus refinement laws are
proved using the theorem prover ProofPower-Z.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We will give a brief
introduction to the notation of CSP and the denotational semantics of the stable
failures model; we then show how to embed this model in PVS; we present some
generic proof tactics and our case study, proving using our formalization that
the asymmetric dining philosophers with an arbitrary number of philosophers
is deadlock-free and deterministic, and that a ‘virtual network’ [22] with any
number of dimensions is deadlock-free as a consequence of various deadlock rules;
finally, we give conclusions and discuss future work.
2 CSP notation
CSP is an event-orientated language for describing concurrent systems and their
interactions. A system can be considered as a process that might be hierarchically
composed of many smaller processes. An individual process can be combined with
events or other processes by operators such as prefixing, choice, parallel composi-
tion, and so on. There are four semantic models available—traces, stable failures,
failures/divergences, and failures/divergences/infinite traces—and which one is
chosen depends on what properties of the system one is trying to analyze. In
this paper, we choose the CSP stable failures model since this provides a rich
enough framework for analysis of deadlock freedom and determinism (for pro-
cesses known to be non-divergent).
The traces model is the simplest model, in which processes are described
according to sequences of events they engage in. The stable failures model, de-
scribed in detail in [14, 18], records stable failures as well as traces.
Traces tell us exactly what a process can do, but nothing about what it can
refuse to do. A refusal set is a set of events from which a process can fail to
accept anything no matter how long it is offered; a failure is then defined as a
pair (t ,X ), where t ∈ traces(P) and X is a refusal of the process P after it has
performed the trace t . If the trace t can make no internal progress, this failure
is called a stable failure.
The basic syntax of CSP we use is described by the following grammar:
P ::= Div | Stop | Skip | a → P | P1 2 P2 | P1 ⊓ P2 |
P1 ‖
A
P2 | P \ A | f (P) | P1; P2
where we assume Σ is a universal set including all possible events for processes
under consideration, a is an element of Σ, and A is a subset of Σ.
Div is a process which does nothing except diverge. Stop is a stable dead-
locked process that never performs any events. Skip is used to denote successfully
termination, and it expresses this by means of the termination event X, which
is not a member of Σ. The process a → P behaves like P after performing the
event a.
The external choice P1 2 P2 may behave either like P1 or like P2, depending
on what events its environment initially offers. The traces of internal choice
P1 ⊓ P2 are the same as those of P1 2 P2, but the choice in this case is non-
deterministic.
The interface parallel P1 ‖
A
P2 is the process where all events in the inter-
face A must be synchronized, and other events can be performed independently.
The interleaving and alphabetized parallel operators can be defined in terms of
interface parallel.
The hiding process P \ A will pass through the same events as P, but events
in the set A become be invisible. The renamed process f (P) means that, for
example, an event a in such a process is completely replaced by f (a) where f
is a mapping function. The sequential composition P1; P2 passes control to P2
when P1 terminates successfully.
Note that recording only stable failures is not enough because it is not guar-
anteed that every process has one. For instance, after a process diverges—that is,
after it reaches a state from which it can perform an infinite sequence of internal
events—it may never reach a stable state, and hence has no more stable failures.
Therefore, it is necessary to record traces separately in the stable failures model;
each process is represented as the pair (traces(P), failures(P)).
The stable failures model consists of all those pairs (T ,F ) with T ⊆ Σ∗X
and F ⊆ Σ∗X × P(ΣX) 1 that satisfy the following conditions:
T is non-empty and prefix closed (SF1)
(t ,X ) ∈ F ⇒ t ∈ T (SF2)
(t ,X ) ∈ F ∧ Y ⊆ X ⇒ (t ,Y ) ∈ F (SF3)
(t ,X ) ∈ F ∧ (∀ a ∈ Y )(t a 〈a〉 6∈ T ⇒ (t ,X ∪Y ) ∈ F ) (SF4)
t a 〈X〉 ∈ T ⇒ (t , Σ) ∈ F (SF5)
t a 〈X〉 ∈ T ⇒ (t a 〈X〉,X ) ∈ F (SF6)
The stable failures model deliberately ignores divergence; in situations in which
divergence is not an issue, this brings considerable convenience in the form of
reduced complexity of the model. For instance, if we know in advance that a
process is divergence-free, using the stable failures model can greatly reduce
the complexity of the refinement (regardless of whether we are doing theorem-
proving or model-checking).
Divergence is not considered as deadlock in the stable failures model, though
it is considered as deadlock in failures/divergences. This is precisely what we
need here: we shall make considerable use of the fact that hiding of events makes
no difference to deadlock freedom. Our formalization follows the denotational
semantics of CSP. Detailed semantics of the stable failures model can be found
in [14].
3 Embedding CSP semantics in PVS
As a first step, we need to formalize the CSP notation in PVS. Dutertre and
Schneider’s embedding of the traces model in PVS [6] already defines most of
the notation that we need; we extend it to the stable failures model, introducing
along the way the new operators and laws of CSP that we will require.
The stable failures model is represented by pairs (T ,F ) in which T is a set
of traces that forms the semantics of a process in the traces model. The classic
formalization of traces is to simply consider traces as lists of events.
The special event X is not a member of Σ and can never be performed by a
process unless this is the last event that it engages in. To represent the extended
alphabet ΣX, we define a datatype as follows:
E [T:TYPE]: DATATYPE WITH SUBTYPES TE, NTE
BEGIN
tick:tick?:TE
ES(a:T):non_tick?:NTE
END E
1 Σ∗ is the set of all finite sequences over Σ and P(Σ) is a powerset; Σ∗X = Σ∗∪{t a
〈X〉 | t ∈ Σ∗} and ΣX = Σ ∪ {X}
where we also define two subtypes TE and NTE. Here, NTE is used to represent Σ.
PVS provides a predefined abstract datatype list. Thus, the type trace
defined as follows is simply a subtype of list.
trace: TYPE ={ l:list[E] | tick_free?(front(l)) }
where the function front returns the entire list except for the final element, and
tick_free? is a predicate that determines whether or not the list includes the
event X. The expression above therefore ensures that X cannot appear except
at the end of a trace.
3.1 Processes
Processes in the stable failures model consist of pairs (T ,F ) that satisfy the
six conditions mentioned in Section 2. Our definition of processes relies on PVS
subtyping: process is a subtype of SF defined as follows:
SF: VAR [set[trace[T]], set[[trace[T],set[E]]]]
process:TYPE= {SF | SF1(SF) and SF2(SF) and SF3(SF) and
SF4(SF) and SF5(SF) and SF6(SF) }
where SF1–SF6 are the six predicate type functions derived from the stable fail-
ures model’s conditions (SF1)–(SF6) from Section 2. Note that T is a type para-
meter which denotes the type of elements of a trace, and trace[T] will auto-
matically add in the special event X.
Operation CSP CSPM PVS
Stop Stop STOP Stop
Skip Skip SKIP Skip
Prefix a → P a -> P a >> P
External choice P1 2 P2 P1 [] P2 P1 \/ P2
Internal choice P1 ⊓ P2 P1 |~| P2 P1 /\ P2
Interface parallel P1 ‖
A
P2 P1 [|A|] P2 Par(A)(P1,P2)
Alphabetized parallel P1 A‖B P2 P1 [A||B] P2 Par(A,B)(P1,P2)
Interleave P1 ||| P2 P1 ||| P2 P1 // P2
Hiding P \ A P\A P/A
Renaming f (P) P[a<->b] Re(P, f)
Sequential composition P1; P2 P1;P2 Seq(P1,P2)
Table 1. CSP syntax
All of CSP’s main operators are listed in Table 1, with the standard CSP
syntax, the CSPM syntax (as used in FDR), and PVS’s syntax. Note that in
this paper, we consider only injective renaming since it leaves the behaviour of a
process unchanged except for the names of the actions, and it thus has a rich set
of laws. Even so, injectivity is not sufficient for some laws in the stable failures
model: sometimes we need the renaming function to be bijective. (This is clearly
an issue only when Σ is infinite.)
We also define indexed versions of the choice and parallel operators, which
are often used in analyzing a large network. In particular, we use Echoice(P)
and Par(A)(P) to denote 2
i∈I
Pi and ‖
n
i=1
(Pi ,Ai) respectively, where P is a
parametric process and A is a parametric set.
FDR’s main function is to determine whether one process refines another.
In the stable failures model, this equates to checking whether the traces and
failures of one process are subsets of the traces and failures of the other:
P ⊑F Q ≡ traces(P) ⊇ traces(Q) ∧ failures(P) ⊇ failures(Q)
The idea of refinement is still kept in verifying properties of processes in PVS.
For example, for proving a process Q deadlock-free, we often explicitly construct
a deadlock-free specification P , then check whether Q refines P or whether Q
is a subset of P . Obviously, if Q refines P and P is deadlock-free, then Q is
deadlock-free as well.
We use the relation ‘<=’ to denote refinement of processes in PVS: Q <= P,
representing P ⊑ Q in CSP, corresponds to Q ⊆ P . Since ‘<=’ and subset? have
been predefined in the prelude library of PVS, we rewrite them so that they can
compare a pair of sets. So <= is defined as the following:
<=(Q, P) : bool = subset?(Q, P)
3.2 Fixed points and recursive processes
Some processes, called recursive processes, may run indefinitely, instead of ex-
ecuting for a finite number of steps and then stopping; Unfortunately, we cannot
define such processes directly in PVS since a theorem prover will not allow us to
get away with any kind of recursive definition unless we can demonstrate that
it is well-defined.
The formalization used in [6] to deal with recursive processes is the ‘µ-
calculus’ theory, which uses a µ operator (‘mu’ in PVS) to compute the least
fixed point of a monotonic function2. We have extended this to the stable fail-
ures model since all CSP operators are monotonic over the stable failures model
with respect to the refinement order and the subset order. We also have proved
a general fixed point induction theorem, which is crucial in analyzing refinement
of recursive processes:
2 A monotonic function in this context is a function F such that if Q ≤ P then
F (Q) ≤ F (P).
induction: PROPOSITION
Div[T] <= H AND (FORALL X : X <= H IMPLIES F(X) <= H)
IMPLIES mu(F) <= H
where Div is the least element in the stable failures model in the subset order,
Div = ({〈〉}, {}).
We also have extended the least-fixed-point theory to represent mutually
recursive processes. The general case of a mutual recursion is concerned with
a family or vector of processes X , and the recursive definition then takes the
form X = F (X ) where F is a function from a vector of processes to a vector of
processes. It is still appropriate to use the least fixed point of the function F to
represent a mutual recursion. In addition, we have proved that all lemmas and
induction theorems of the least fixed point still hold in mutual recursions.
In order for fixed points to be useful, we will usually want to show that a
function has a unique fixed point. Roscoe [14] shows how to apply a restriction
operator and a constructive function to demonstrate the existence of a unique
fixed point. We first formally define the restriction operator
chop(P, n):process[T]=( {t| P‘1(t) and length(t) <= n},
{(t,A)| P‘2(t,A) and length(t) < n})
where the purpose of ‘chop’ is to restrict the process P so that it can never
perform any traces of greater than length n ∈ N. Note that we here use ‘<’
for stable failures in the definition because we want to make such a definition
consistent with a fact that Div is the least element in the subset order.
We then say that F is constructive if
constructive?(F):bool= FORALL P,Q,n: chop(P,n)=chop(Q,n)
IMPLIES chop(F(P),n+1)=chop(F(Q),n+1)
If, for a function F , we have that whenever F (X ) = X and F (Y ) = Y
then X = Y , then we say that F has a unique fixed point. To prove that any
constructive function has a unique fixed point, we make use of the following
lemma:
chop_equiv: LEMMA FORALL n: (chop(P,n)=chop(Q,n)) IFF P=Q
The mathematical background of the unique fixed point theorem is not
covered in this paper; Roscoe [14] gives a detailed explanation in terms of partial
orders and of metric spaces.
In addition, we have proven a number of algebraic laws which are essential
in the verification of properties of processes, whereas these laws can help us to
verify the consistency of the CSP semantics.
4 Generic proof tactics
Our aim in embedding the denotational semantics of the stable failures model
of CSP into PVS is not only to verify the consistency of theories and algebraic
laws of CSP, but also to build up some strategies so that we can check properties
of various infinite-state systems. The focus is especially on liveness properties,
which cannot be analyzed in the traces model. Our first step in this direction
is the verification of some general properties such as determinism and deadlock
freedom.
4.1 Determinism
A deterministic process always behaves in the same way when offered exactly
the same inputs. The most obvious practical benefit is that this kind of process
is testable because its behaviour does not vary unless the external inputs are
changed.
determinism [T:TYPE ] : THEORY
BEGIN
IMPORTING fixed_points[T]
t: VAR trace[E]
a: VAR E
n: VAR nat
A,B: VAR set[E]
P,Q,X: VAR process[E]
F: VAR [process[E]->process[E]]
DET?(P):bool= FORALL t,a: P‘1(add(t,a))
IMPLIES NOT P‘2((t,singleton(a)))
det_stop: LEMMA DET?(Stop[E])
det_prefix: LEMMA DET?(P) IMPLIES DET?(a>>P)
det_par: LEMMA DET?(P) AND DET?(Q) IMPLIES DET?(Par(A,B)(P,Q))
det_seq: LEMMA DET?(P) AND DET?(Q) IMPLIES DET?(Seq(P,Q))
det_chop: LEMMA DET?(P) IFF (FORALL n: DET?(chop(P,n)))
det_subset: LEMMA (DET?(P) AND Q <= P ) IMPLIES DET?(Q)
det_induction: LEMMA ( constructive?(F) AND (EXISTS X: DET?(X))
AND (FORALL X: DET?(X) IMPLIES DET?(F(X))) )
IMPLIES DET?(mu(F))
END determinism
Fig. 1. Examples of deterministic rules
Of course, only processes known to be divergence-free can be verified in the
stable failures model, because this model cannot detect divergence. In Figure 1,
the definition DET? states that a deterministic process can not accept an event a
as well as being able to refuse this event; here, add(t,a) adds the event a onto
the end of the trace t. Note that E has been previously defined as a datatype
including the special event X.
Some CSP operators preserve determinism: if P and Q are deterministic then
so are Stop, a → P , P A‖B Q and sequential composition P ;Q . Such laws and
some useful lemmas are also listed in Figure 1. Furthermore, if initials(P) and
initials(Q) are disjoint then P 2 Q is also deterministic. Here, initials(P) is the
set of all of P ’s initial events; for example, it can be defined as follows:
initials(P) = {a ∈ ΣX | 〈a〉 ∈ traces(P)}
Proving determinism of non-recursive processes is often not difficult but it
can be time consuming. For recursive processes, one has to apply an induction
rule such as det_induction in Figure 1 to make any progress; this rule states
that if F is constructive and determinism-preserving then the least fixed point
of F is also deterministic.
Note that the induction rule here does not imply that every recursive determ-
inistic process is the least fixed point of a constructive determinism-preserving
function. In addition, it is also possible in some cases to infer the determinism of
mu(F ) directly. Usually, however, the easiest way to prove that a recursive pro-
cess is deterministic is by means of this theorem. For this reason, the determinism
induction theorem proved here will be extremely useful in many applications.
4.2 Deadlock freedom
One of the most important concepts concerning concurrent systems is deadlock,
which arises when no further progress can be made. Deadlock is a kind of liveness
property, so we cannot detect or reason about it using traces alone. The stable
failures model, however, is quite suitable for describing deadlock freedom. The
definition of deadlock freedom as well as some laws are given in Figure 2.
Divergence is considered deadlock-free in the stable failures model, while it
is not deadlock-free in the failures/divergences model. The usual way to prove
deadlock freedom of a recursive process is to define a deadlock-free specification
explicitly, and prove that the process is a refinement of the specification; then
obviously the refining process is deadlock-free as well.
Figure 2 also shows two important laws, dlf_hide and dlf_rename, that are
extremely useful in the analysis of deadlock freedom in the stable failures model.
These two facts underpin the definition of deadlock freedom: deadlock means
reaching a state where no further progress is possible regardless of whether the
actions are renamed or hidden.
Deadlock freedom is a global property; in other words, we cannot guaran-
tee that if all components of a network are individually deadlock-free then the
whole network will also be deadlock-free. Often, the complexity and the work of
verification of a particular property can be greatly reduced by decomposing a
global property of a network into local properties of the network’s components;
this is not easy to do, however, with deadlock freedom.
deadlock_free [T: TYPE] : THEORY
BEGIN
....
a: VAR E
t: VAR trace[E]
P,Q: VAR process[E]
A: VAR set[E]
f: VAR [set[E]->set[E]]
DLF?(P):bool = FORALL t: P‘1(t) IMPLIES NOT P‘2((t,fullset))
dlf_prefix: LEMMA DLF?(P) IMPLIES DLF?(a>>P)
dlf_echoice: LEMMA DLF?(P) AND DLF?(Q) IMPLIES DLF?(P\/Q)
dlf_hide: LEMMA DLF?(P) IFF DLF?( P/ A )
dlf_rename: LEMMA injective?(f)
IMPLIES (DLF?(P) IFF DLF?(Re(P,f)))
dlf_subset: LEMMA subset?(P,Q) AND DLF?(Q) IMPLIES DLF?(P)
....
END deadlock_free
Fig. 2. Generic deadlock-free rules
There are, however, some deadlock rules that can be used to analyze a large
network locally rather than considering the whole network all the time. Ros-
coe [14] gives various deadlock rules, and shows how to apply these rules to
prove deadlock freedom of some large networks. We have proved some of these
deadlock rules at a formal level, in order to be able to construct formal proofs
of deadlock freedom of various networks.
The terminology introduced here is taken from [14]. We consider a net-
work V = ‖
n
i=1
(Pi ,Ai), which is a parallel composition of a finite sequence
of processes 〈P1, . . . ,Pn〉 and their alphabets. We shall suppose that V is triple-
disjoint3, and that no component process ever terminates or deadlocks. In such
a network, a state is defined as the pair (s , 〈X1, ...,Xn〉) in a network V where
s ∈ (
⋃n
i=1 Ai)
∗, (s ↾ Ai ,Xi) ∈ failures(Pi ), and Xi ⊇ Σ 8 initials(Pi/(s ↾ Ai)).
Here, ↾ is the projection operator and 8 is to calculate difference of two sets.
Therefore, a state is in deadlock if the union of all refusal sets Xi is equal to the
Σ.
The concepts that we shall need, such as ungranted request, conflict and
so on are now straightforward to define formally in Figure 3. Note that we
here completely ignore the event X since the assumption is that no Pi can
terminate. In a state (s , 〈XP ,XQ〉), we say there is an ungranted request from
P to Q in the composition P A‖B Q if P can communicate in B but they
3 If Pi ,Pj and Pk are three distinct nodes of V , then Ai ∩Aj ∩Ak = ∅.
conflict[T:TYPE]: THEORY
BEGIN
....
A,B,X1,X2:VAR set[T]
P,Q: VAR process[T]
t: VAT trace[T]
....
ung_request?(A,B)(P,Q)(t,X1,X2):bool = P‘2(proj(t,A),X1) AND
Q‘2(proj(t,B),X2) AND subset?(sigma(t),union(A,B)) AND
subset?(complement(initials(P,proj(t,A))),X1) AND
subset?(complement(initials(Q,proj(t,B))),X2) AND
subset?(union(complement(X1),complement(X2)), intersection(A,B))
AND intersection(B,complement(X1)) /= emptyset AND
subset?(intersection(B,complement(X1)),X2)
CF?(A,B)(P,Q):bool=EXISTS t,X1,X2: ung_request?(A,B)(P,Q)(t,X1,X2)
AND ung_request?(B,A)(Q,P)(t,X2,X1)
SCF?(A,B)(P,Q):bool=EXISTS t,X1,X2: ung_request?(A,B)(P,Q)(t,X1,X2)
AND ung_request?(B,A)(Q,P)(t,X2,X1)
AND ( subset?(complement(X1), B) OR subset?(complement(X2), A) )
....
CFF?(X)(S):bool= FORALL i,j: i/=j IMPLIES
NOT CF?(X(i),X(j))(S(i),S(j))
SCFF?(X)(S):bool= FORALL i,j: i/=j IMPLIES
NOT SCF?(X(i),X(j))(S(i),S(j))
....
END conflict
Fig. 3. The definitions of ungranted request and conflict
can not agree on any communication in A ∩ B . Obviously, ungranted requests
are the underlying factors that result in deadlock. We here use a predicate
ung_request?(A,B)(P,Q)(t,X1,X2) in Figure 3 to define such an ungranted
request.
There is a conflict between P and Q if there is an ungranted request in
both directions. The formal definition may be expressed as CF?(A,B)(P,Q) in
Figure 3. Additionally, a strong conflict is a conflict in which one of the two
processes has its only ungranted request to the other. Finally, a network V is
conflict free if no pair of its nodes is in conflict. We here use CFF?(X)(S) to
describe this property in Figure 3.
The following fundamental result quoted from [14] underlies all of the dead-
lock rules.
deadlock_rules[T:TYPE]: THEORY
BEGIN
....
NET:TYPE=[size,[below[size]->set[E]],[below[size]->process[T]]]
V: VAR NET
dl_ung_request: LEMMA (Assump?(X)(S) AND SCFF?(X)(S) AND DL?(X)(S))
IMPLIES
FORALL i:EXISTS j,k: (S(i)/=S(j) AND S(j)/=S(k) AND S(i)/=S(k))
AND (EXISTS t,X1,X2:ung_request?(X(i),X(j))(S(i),S(j)(t,X1,X2)))
AND (EXISTS t,X1,X2:ung_request?(X(j),X(k))(S(j),S(k)(t,X1,X2)))
....
fundamental_princple: LEMMA (ASSUMP?(V‘2)(V‘3) AND CFF?(V‘2)(V‘3)
AND DL?(V‘2)(V‘3)) IMPLIES cycle?(V)
pre_rule2?(V):bool = ASSUMP?(V‘2)(V‘3) AND CFF?(V‘2)(V‘3) AND
( (EXISTS t,X1,X2: V‘3(j)<=V‘3(i) AND
ung_request?(V‘2(i),V‘2(j))(V‘3(i),V‘3(j))(t,X1,x2))
IMPLIES ( FORALL (k:{x:nat|V‘3(x)<=V‘3(i) AND
intersection(V‘2(x),V‘2(i))/=emptyset}):
EXISTS t,X1,X2:
ung_request?(V‘2(k),V‘2(i))(V‘3(k),V‘3(i))(t,X1,X2)) )
deadlock_rule2: LEMMA pre_rule2?(V) IMPLIES (NOT DL?(V‘2)(V‘3))
....
END deadlock_rules
Fig. 4. The deadlock rules
Fundamental Principle of Deadlock. If V is a network which satisfies our
basic assumptions and which is free of strong conflict, then any deadlock state of
V contains a proper cycle of ungranted requests.
To prove this law, we have to define a finite network, as in Figure 4, which
guarantees the existence of a proper cycle of ungranted requests. One of the
most important laws with regard to ungranted requests is dl_ung_requestwhich
shows that in a deadlock state, for any node, there always exist two other distinct
nodes such that the three nodes together form a sequence of ungranted requests.
The proof of this fundamental law comes as a fairly straightforward con-
sequence of the lemma dl_ung_request, because any ungranted request from
any process Si to another process Sj will then guarantee an ungranted request
from Sj to some Sk , and so on; this sequence must repeat since the network is fi-
nite. In the formal definition listed in Figure 4, we use a predicate DL?(V‘2)(V‘3)
to denote deadlock of the network, and use a predicate cycle?(V) to show that
there exists at least one cycle of ungranted requests in the network.
By making use of this fundamental principle, we have proved Deadlock Rule 2
quoted from [14] as well:
Deadlock Rule 2. Suppose V is conflict-free and has a node ordering < such
that whenever node Pi has a request to any Pj with Pj < Pi , then it has a request
to all its neighbours Pk such that Pk < Pi . Then V is deadlock free.
The formal proof just translates the one given in [14] into PVS. If V can deadlock,
then there is a cycle of ungranted requests which must contain one maximal Pi ;
necessarily Pi has an ungranted request to Pi+1 less than itself, then it also has
a request to Pi−1; and this violates the assumption of conflict freedom. Such a
rule is formally expressed in Figure 4 where <= denotes a partial order, and we
also find out any process’s neighbours by only comparing their algebras.
5 Case study
We show the power of the formalization of CSP semantics by two examples: the
dining philosophers problem and the ‘virtual network’ [22].
5.1 The dining philosophers problem
The dining philosophers problem was first described by Edsger W. Dijkstra in
1965. It is a classic multi-process synchronization problem. The problem consists
of n philosophers sitting at a table with a bowl of spaghetti in the middle.
Between each pair of adjacent philosophers, there is a single fork; and to eat, a
philosopher must be holding both of the forks that are beside him. We assume
all philosophers pick forks up in the same order—right hand first—and do not
put down any fork they have picked up until they have grabbed both. Figure 5
shows the dining philosophers network’s structure, composed of philosopher/fork
pairs.
It is quite straightforward to prove determinism of the n dining philosoph-
ers problem in combination with the det_induction rule in Figure 1 and the
properties of various CSP operators. In Figure 6, H(i,j)(X) and F(i,j)(X) are
used to express the behaviour of an individual philosopher and fork respectively
where i denotes the total number of philosophers; pick(j,j) denotes that the
j th philosopher picks up the j th fork, and so does putdown(j,j); inc(i,j)
denotes addition modulo i . Note that each philosopher and fork process is para-
meterized not only by its index but also by the total number of philosophers,
since this affects the modular calculation. Moreover both the philosopher and
the fork are recursive processes, and we use the least fixed points of the func-
tions H and F to represent them in PVS. Here PandF(i,j) is used to represent
the combination of a philosopher and his right-hand fork where AP(i,j) and
AF(i,j) denote their alphabets.
For constructing the proof, we need only to prove that the processes PHIL(i,j)
and FORK(i,j) are deterministic; then the alphabetized parallel combination
PHIL
PHIL
PHIL
PHIL
PHIL
PHIL
FORK
FORK
FORK
FORK
FORK
FORK0 0
1
1
2
0
k
k
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Fig. 5. Inductive structure of dining philosophers
PandF(i,j) is deterministic by means of the det_par rule in Figure 1; the en-
tire system COLLEGE(n) is then also deterministic since it consists of PandF(n,m)
for m < n.
Deadlock freedom is a more tricky issue. Obviously for the dining philosoph-
ers problem, the one and only one situation causing deadlock is that in which
all philosophers hold their right-hand forks simultaneously and wait for their
neighbours to put down their forks. There are many modifications one can make
to avoid deadlock, one of which results in the asymmetric dining philosophers
problem: one philosopher picks up a left-hand fork first.
The basic strategy we adopt is similar to an induction used in [15], where the
authors use a hierarchical compression technique in FDR to prove the case with
huge numbers of philosophers. The key idea is that by hiding their internal events
and carefully renaming their interface events, we can prove that any number
(n > 1) of right-handed pairs of philosophers and forks are equivalent. The
proof starts from the case with n = 3 philosophers; then, for the inductive step,
we assume that the case of n = k philosophers is deadlock-free, and show that
the system remains deadlock-free when the number of philosophers is n = k +1.
Figure 7 roughly shows the inductive steps of proving that the asymmetric
dining philosophers network is deadlock-free. First of all, the definition of the
philosophers has been changed since we force the zeroth philosopher to pick up
his left-hand fork first. Figure 5 also shows how we deduce deadlock freedom
of k + 1 philosophers from the case of k philosophers. The key to achieving
this step is to prove the equivalence of two processes: k philosophers and k + 1
philosophers. Such an idea is proved in the lemma phil_dlf_hr in Figure 7
where C(n) is restricted to be the parallel combination of pairs of philosophers
philosopher_det: THEORY
BEGIN
....
H(i,j)(X): process[events] = pickup(j,j)>>(pickup(j,inc(i,j))>>
(putdown(j,inc(i,j))>>(putdown(j,j)>>X)))
F(i,j)(X): process[events] =( (pickup(j,j)>>(putdown(j,j)>>X))
\/ (pickup(dec(i,j),j)>>(putdown(dec(i,j),j)>>X)))
PHIL(i,j): process[events] = mu(H(i,j))
FORK(i,j): process[events] = mu(F(i,j))
PandF(i,j):process[events] =
Par(AP(i,j),AF(i,j))(PHIL(i,j),FORK(i,j))
....
P(n)(m):process[events] = PandF(n,m)
APF(n)(m):set[events] = union(AP(n,m),AF(n,m))
COLLEGE(n): process[events] = Par(APF(n))(P(n))
fork_det: LEMMA DET?(FORK(i,j))
phil_det: LEMMA DET?(PHIL(i,j))
pair_det: LEMMA DET?(PandF(i,j))
college_det: LEMMA DET?(COLLEGE(n))
....
END philosopher_det
Fig. 6. proving determinism of the dining philosophers problem
and forks without involving the pair of the zeroth philosopher and his right-hand
fork.
Certainly, it is unnecessary to compare all pairs, and we need to concentrate
only on the last two pairs in the circle of Figure 5. The key to the induction is
that if we hide the internal events of the parallel combination of PandF(k,k-2)
and PandF(k,k-1), it is equivalent to the parallel combination of PandF(k+1,k-
2), PandF(k+1,k-1) and PandF(k+1,k) with their internal events hidden and
pickup(k,0) and putdown(k,0) renamed as pickup(k-1,0) and putdown(k-
1,0) respectively. Therefore, it is transformed into the lemma phil_key in Fig-
ure 7 in which IE(k) and IE(k+1) denote the sets of internal events and f is
a bijective function which performs the renaming operation. To get the final
result that the case of k + 1 philosophers is deadlock-free, we have to combine
two laws, dlf_hide and dlf_rename, which are mentioned in the above section.
Consequently, the proof is completely established in the lemma phil_dlf in
Figure 7.
Note that although it would be possible to prove the lemma phil_key in
PVS, it would be in one sense perverse to do so, since it is essentially a very
small model-checking exercise. It would take a long time to trace through the
philosopher_dlf:THEORY
BEGIN
....
H(i,j)(X): process[events] =
IF j=0 THEN pickup(j,inc(i,j))>>(pickup(j,j)>>
(putdown(j,j)>>(putdown(j,inc(i,j))>>X)))
ELSE pickup(j,j)>>(pickup(j,inc(i,j))>>
(putdown(j,inc(i,j))>>(putdown(j,j)>>X)))
ENDIF
....
PL(n:{x:int|x>2})(m:{x:int|m>0 and m<n})
:process[events]= PandF(n,m)
C(n):process[events] = Par(APF(n))(PL(n))
COLLEGE(n):process[events] = Par(I(n))(PandF(n,0),C(n))
....
phil3_dlf: LEMMA DLF?(COLLEGE(3))
phil_key: ASSUMPTION
(Par(APF2(k))(PL2(k))/IE(k)
=Re((Par(APF3(k+1))(PL3(k+1))/IE(k+1)), f)
phil_dlf_hr: LEMMA C(n)/IE(n) = Re(C(n+1)/IE(n+1),f)
phil_dlf: LEMMA DLF?(COLLEGE(n))
....
END philosopher_dlf
Fig. 7. Proving the asymmetric dining philosophers problem deadlock-free
states of each side one by one checking for correspondence; FDR, on the other
hand, can verify the equation in a fraction of a second. The approach we take,
therefore, is to build this equation into the PVS theory as an assumption, and
then prove it in FDR. In this way, we harness the power of the theorem prover for
establishing results about an infinite-state system, whilst retaining the speed and
automation of a model-checker for certain small parts of the proof. Using PVS in
combination with FDR, then, we have successfully proven the asymmetric dining
philosophers network with an arbitrary number of philosophers to be deadlock-
free. This strategy of using a theorem prover and a model checker in concert is
extremely powerful: the different types of tool complement each other very well.
By using both together, we can analyze systems that would be out of reach of
either individually.
virtual_network:THEORY
....
F(i,j)(X)(0):process[events] =
in(x,y,m)>>X(1)\/(I_up(x,y,m)>>X(1) \/ I_left(x,y,m)>>X(1))
F(i,j)(X)(1):process[events] =
IF i<x THEN I_right(x,y,m) >> X(0)
ELSIF j<y THEN I_down(x,y,m) >> X(0)
ELSE over(x,y,m) >> X(0) ENDIF
H(i,j)(Y)(0):process[events]=
over(x,y,m)>>Y(1)\/(O_down(x,y,m)>>Y(1)\/O_right(x,y,m)>>Y(1))
H(i,j)(Y)(1):process[events]=
IF i>x THEN O_left(x,y,m) >> Y(0)
ELSIF j>y THEN O_up(x,y,m) >> Y(0)
ELSE out(x,y,m) >> Y(0) ENDIF
IN(i,j):process[events] = mu(F(i,j))
OUT(i,j):process[events] = mu(H(i,j))
....
deadlock_check: LEMMA pre_rule2?(VN)
END virtual_network
Fig. 8. The virtual network
5.2 The virtual network
We now demonstrate the use of Deadlock Rule 2 by means of a routing algorithm
example called the ‘virtual network’, quoted in [14] and originally given in [22].
Suppose we want to send a package from any one of the nodes Ni,j to any other
in a rectangular grid. It seems that the above rule can not directly applied to
this system. Roscoe however wisely divides each node Ni,j in the system into two
parallel processes Ii,j and Oi,j , and defines a partial order such that Ii,j ≤ Ii′,j ′
iff i ≤ i ′ ∧ j ≤ j ′, Oi,j ≤ Oi′,j ′ iff i ≥ i
′ ∧ j ≥ j ′, and Ii,j ≤ Oi′,j ′ for all i , j , i
′, j ′,
to satisfy the assumptions of this rule.
This partial order implies that a package is transmitted through Ii,j in in-
creasing index order, whereas through Oi,j it is in decreasing index order. For ex-
ample, if a package is sent fromN1,3 toN2,2, then the path is 〈I1,3, I2,3,O2,3,O2,2〉.
The CSP code used to represent such a system using mutual recursion can be
found in [14], and we here transform it into PVS in Figure 8 where IN(i,j) and
OUT(i,j) are used to represent the two synchronized processes, and VN denotes
the entire system. Obviously, this system transparently satisfies the requirements
of Rule 2.
By making use of Deadlock Rule 2, we have additionally formally proved that
a network with any number of dimensions is deadlock-free. In the definition of
such a rule, we use an interpreted type size to denote the size of the network;
in other words, the number of dimensions of the network can be anything drawn
from the type of size.
Proving the new network to be deadlock-free needs careful work, because
there are a number of issues involved—for instance, checking whether the net-
work meets freedom of conflict, one of the assumptions of Rule 2, and proving
that two mutually recursive processes are conflict-free. Along the way, we have
constructed various theorems such as the conflict free induction theorem to cope
with recursive processes. The final result is a proof of correctness that cannot be
easily established in a model checker.
6 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we have presented an embedding of the stable failures model of
CSP into PVS that preserves the algebraic properties of CSP, and then used this
formalism to prove determinism and deadlock freedom of the asymmetric dining
philosophers problem with an arbitrary number of philosophers, and an example
of layered routing. Theorem proving is a good complement of model-checking
tools such as FDR, which can efficiently verify finite-state systems, but which
cannot verify infinite-state systems without outside help.
One of the biggest advantages of a theorem prover is that it is possible to
reason about systems with massive or infinite state spaces, admittedly at the
cost of sacrificing automatic proof. Verifying a system like our example requires
considerable work. However, PVS is a deductive system in which all completed
proofs can be used in later proofs. In the course of constructing this proof, we
have amassed many lemmas and theorems that will make proving properties of
other systems substantially less time-consuming, both for us and for others.
The stable failures model, as well as allowing one to verify properties relat-
ing to deadlock freedom, contains sufficient detail to specify many other liveness
properties. We are in the process of building up a general platform that provides
mechanical assistance for formal analysis of liveness properties of systems. We
believe that our model can be used in many different application areas, such
as verification of security protocols and general communication protocols. For
example, Schneider [17] has modelled and analyzed some properties of a non-
repudiation protocol using the traces model of CSP, but some of the other (al-
leged) properties of the protocol can be formulated only in terms of liveness, and
treatment of them requires consideration of failures as well as traces. In addition,
we have analyzed and verified the fairness property of the timed Zhou-Gollmann
non-repudiation protocol using FDR [21], and work is in progress on extend-
ing this analysis in PVS to cover an infinite network of communicating agents.
Denial of service is also naturally specified as a liveness property [12], and one
that we expect to be able to use our work to analyze.
Our embedding of stable failures model of CSP in PVS is still to some extent
work in progress, but its usefulness is already apparent. We have proven many
important theorems such as the unique fixed point theorem, the determinism
induction rule and so on, and then shown determinism and deadlock freedom of
complex networks with an arbitrary number of components.
We aim in future work to apply our model to other types of network and
investigate possible ways to analyze liveness properties of other systems. In our
long-term plan, we hope to extend our model to the failures/divergences model;
we would like then to extend it further to include infinite traces, which is an area
that currently has no tool support at all.
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